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SAS Approved for Release
Evil Bad Guys Cause Accidents? 
 Most accidents originate in actions committed by 
reasonable, rational individuals who were acting to 
achieve an assigned task in what they perceived to be 
a responsible and professional manner.
— Peter Harle, Director of Accident Prevention,Transportation Safety Board of Canada and former RCAF pilot, 
'Investigation of human factors: The link to accident prevention.' In Johnston, N., McDonald, N., & Fuller, R. 
(Eds.), Aviation Psychology in Practice, 1994
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Success teaches 
us nothing; 
only failure 
teaches
Admiral Hyman G. Rickover
Father of the US Nuclear Navy
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Success and Adversity
 87 successful space shuttle flights between Challenger and Columbia
 “Cultural traits and organizational practices detrimental to safety were allowed to develop 
including reliance on past successes as a substitute for sound engineering practices …‟ 
- Columbia Accident Investigation Board, September 2003
 Several Technical Issues faced by the Space Shuttle Program before Columbia:
Ball-Strut-Tie Rod Assembly (BSTRA) Main Prop System Flowliner Cracks
TVC Hydraulic Power Unit ET Foam loss
ETA Ring Structural Margin SRB Nozzle Pocketing
SRB Insulation Ply Lifting SRB Nozzle Bonds
SRB Propellant Cracks Payload Bay Door Power Drive Unit
MLP Corrosion – Hydrogen Vent Line Orbiter Corrosion Rudder/Speedbrake
Orbiter Wiring Transporter Bearings
Pyrotechnic Duds Main EngineTurbine Tip Seals
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Minor Maintenance Issue – Tile Damage
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As Columbia Counted Down to Launch
 The Space Shuttle perceived as “Operational” and “a Mature System” after flying for 22 years and 
112 flights
 No major surprises expected 
 Environments and hardware thought to be well understood.
 NASA under intense budgetary pressure – costs must be reduced
 Annual inflation adjusted Shuttle budget reduced 45% between 1991 and 2002
 NASA under intense schedule pressure – Space Station Assembly significantly behind schedule 
 Columbia mission STS-107 was considered “routine” and “low complexity”
 On Orbit repair to heat shield considered impossible “Nothing We Can Do” – an “Accepted Risk”
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Success leads to Failure
 Success can be more dangerous than failure
 Learn to ask for help early
 Keep your leaders informed
 Don’t be like the frog in the pot of water – boiled to death slowly
 Encourage your subordinates to report problems and ask for help
 Don’t punish them inadvertently – encourage ‘bad news’ reports
 Don’t punish them by over helping them
Failure really is an option – Lucy V. Kranz
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NASA’s Return to Flight Rationale
I
Elimination of Critical 
Debris
II
Impact Detection During 
Ascent
III
On-Orbit Debris 
Impact/Damage Detection
IV
On-Orbit TPS Repair
(Tile & RCC)
V
Crew Rescue
Primary 
Hazard 
Control
Warning 
Devices
Special 
Procedures
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Space Shuttle Risk of Loss 
Vehicle and Crew
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Space Shuttle Risk of Loss 
Vehicle and Crew
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Post Columbia
 Several Senior (retired) NASA officials involved in Space Shuttle Development gave us two areas 
to avoid:
 On Orbit Tile Repair will never work – we tried everything 20 years ago and nothing worked
 Do not change the outer mold line of the shuttle stack – the aerodynamics are too hard to get right
 In Return to Flight we were forced to do both
 On Orbit Tile and RCC repair materials and techniques developed and validated
 Ice-Frost-Ramp reduced, Protuberance-Air-Load ramp removed, wind tunnel campaign verified aero loads
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Addressing the Culture
 NASA Administrator Sean O’Keefe emphatically instructed all employees to “Accept the 
[CAIB] Report” 
 Posters all over the agency asked “Have you read the report?”
 Independent Review Teams (ASAP, RTFTG, others) met almost continuously to ensure 
the Space Shuttle Program rigorously completed all requirements for return to flight
 Program Management power curbed with checks and balances from Independent 
Technical Authorities
 Behavior Sciences Technology company hired to retrain NASA managers 
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Safety and Management Changes
 Mission Management Team (MMT)
 Significant changes to the composition and focus of the MMT
 Formal training requirements established
 Now a well-functioning real-time management body
 New MMT room designed to facilitate open communication
 Safety and Mission Assurance (S&MA)
 Reinvigorated independent S&MA at HQ and Centers
 Strengthened Shuttle Program S&MA and Systems Engineering and Integration capabilities
 Established Independent Technical Authority and technical warrant holders
 NASA Engineering and Safety Center
 Established at Langley as an independent 
source of engineering and technical expertise
 Important resource for Space Shuttle engineering 
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Management  Re-Training
 Reading assignments on management culture and best practices
 “Angle of Attack” about Apollo 1 Fire
 “The Challenger Launch Decision”
 Hiring of two academic management experts to embed with the mission 
management team
 Dr. Don Van Ende from Trinity University
 Dr. Chris Jones from University of Central Florida
 Multiple MMT training sessions and very specific certification 
requirements
 Lectures by experts on management culture
 Dr. Diane Vaughn
 Dr. Charles Perrow
 Dr. Nancy Levison
 Dr. Edward Tufte
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Culture Change Initiatives 
 Attendance at MMT and PRCB mandatory for senior managers 
(substitutes not allowed)
 Inclusion of all NASA centers in decision making emphasized
 New Mission Management Team room built
 Round Table
 Teleconferenced all meetings with all NASA Centers
 Call on all parties – not just subject matter experts – for their advice and review
 Smaller, ‘warmer’ conference rooms designed for MMT
 Behavorial Sciences Technology, Inc.  Hired to observe and debrief all 
Space Shuttle Program meetings
 Emphasis on drawing out ‘weak signals’
 Emphasis on non-confrontational management style 
 Emphasis on civility and courtesy
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Management Classes Added
 Cockpit Resource Management course by Flight Safety International developed into Spaceflight 
Resource Management class taught internally
 Safety Culture Training Class developed
 Lessons in writing ‘white papers’ vs. building PowerPoint presentations
 Lessons in human social interaction were instituted
 How to draw out dissenting opinions
 The valuable use of silence in meetings
16
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Fighting the Culture Wars
 Many ‘old line’ managers resisted the culture changes as ‘coddling’ the workforce – and wasting 
time
 While some personnel transfers to S&MA were made, it was still regarded as a sideline 
organization to be avoided
 Cultural Biases are hard to change
 Senior NASA HQ management agonized over the slowness of return to flight
 “Take the foam off the bipod and fly in October 2003”
 Some independent reviewers remained skeptical – hostile – to the very end
 Virtually everyone hated BST
17
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More Pushback
 Frequently heard comment:  “The CAIB got it wrong”
 Generally heard from senior (old line) managers
 Generally regarding NASA organizational culture
 “Not invented here” syndrome continues to exacerbate inter-center relationship difficulties
 Email from a retired senior NASA executive to me in late 2015 (typical of many received):
“The general thrust of the questions give me some concern. The strong emphasis seems to be 
targeted toward "Organizational Culture". The principal thought appears to be correcting a culture where 
young engineers at a low organizational level could not exercise proper influence.
I am not aware of any organizational cultural flaw of this nature having any effect on the Shuttle Program 
Management's lack of attention to foam shedding from the tank. What am I missing?
The so called organizational cultural flaw attributed to the Challenger accident is a very different issue. 
The o-ring discussion between a contractor and MSFC that occurred prior to the Challenger launch has 
no relationship to Columbia that I am aware of.
Are we chasing ghosts invented by the CAIB?”
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Embrace Dissent
“If we are all in agreement on the decision – then I propose we postpone 
further discussion of this matter until our next meeting to give ourselves 
time to develop disagreement and perhaps gain some understanding of 
that the decision is all about”
– Charles E.  Wilson, CEO of General Motors, 1950
Listen to weak signals and poor arguments for the truth they hold but are having difficulty 
communicating. 
Tip:  Appoint a ‘devil’s advocate’ to make the argument on the other side when all appear to be in 
agreement.
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Afraid to Ask for Help
 Sometimes people are afraid to ask for help because they might get more help than they want.  Or 
at least more management attention than they want.
 Many times our team members want to be the ‘hero’ that saves the program – the one that works 
all day and all night and gets the vehicle to flight no matter what
 More often than not, those ‘heroes’ are unsuccessful, and the issues come out very late – when 
resources could have been provided to help solve them earlier
 One Project Manager:  “Don’t worry Boss, we have it under control.  I’ll let you know when to 
worry.”  Me:  “That makes me worry more than ever”
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Trying to break out of the mold
 Commercial Crew and Commercial Cargo programs are an attempt to lighten NASA 
control and allow for innovation and flexibility – and lower cost
 Shuttle had 40,000 specifications and requirements, Constellation had (estimated) over 
100,000 specifications and requirements, Commercial Crew has about 10,000 
specifications and requirements
 NASA trying to relinquish control in areas where the technology is more mature and 
private companies can be motivated to adequately provide safety and reliability at lower 
cost
 Results are open, human spaceflight certification is pending.
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http://www.nasa.gov/pdf/469245main_GovernmentInsightForCommercialCrewTransportation.
pdf
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Fifteen Years On – What Has Changed
 Anecdotal evidence that emphasis on safety has eroded
 Alternatively, emphasis on process and ‘safety’ have increased cost and delayed schedule 
critically on new NASA programs
 Balance is needed
 Anecdotal evidence that old management styles have crept back in
 Not looking for dissenting opinions
 More concerned with schedule and cost than risk
 Some changes have devolved into ‘checking the square’
 “No dissenting opinions” frequent statement on management briefings
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NASA as a High Reliability Organization
 Preoccupied with [the Possibility of] Failure
 A Learning Organization
 Internal Lessons Documented, Studied
 Lessons from Others Gleaned and Studied
 Reluctant to Simplify Interpretations
 Sensitive to Operations
 Committed to Resilience
 Redundancy or “defense in depth”
 Deferential to Expertise
 Management defers to Engineering defers to “hands-on” personnel
24
SAS Approved for Release
Ten Enduring Lessons
 It can happen to you.  
 Focus.  
 Speak up.
 You are not nearly as smart as you think you are.  
 Dissention has tremendous value.  
 Question the Conventional Wisdom
 Do good work.
 Engineering is done with numbers
 Use your imagination
 Nothing worthwhile was accomplished without taking risk.
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